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Abstract
We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personal-
ized pricing (PP), whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers, based on their
willingness to pay. We embed personalized pricing in a model of vertical product differentiation,
and show how it affects firms’ choices over quality. We show that firms’ optimal pricing strate-
gies with PP may be non-monotonic in consumer valuations. When the PP firm has a high
quality both firms raise their qualities, relative to the uniform pricing case. Conversely, when
the PP firm has low quality, both firms lower their qualities. Although many firms are trying to
implement such pricing policies, we find that a higher quality firm can actually be worse off with
PP. While it is optimal for the firm adopting PP to increase product differentiation, the non-PP
firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving in closer in the quality space. While PP results
in a wider market coverage, it also leads to aggravated price competition between firms. Since
this entails a change in equilibrium qualities, the nature of the cost function determines whether
firms gain or lose by implementing such PP policies. Despite the threat of first-degree price
discrimination, we find that personalized pricing with competing firms can lead to an overall
increase in consumer welfare.
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1 Introduction
Different consumers typically derive different value from the same product. Firms often respond
to this heterogeneity in valuations by trying to determine what customers will pay. This is done in
a variety of ways: by understanding the nature of a customer’s business and how the product will
be used, by asking about their budget during a negotiation or via market research using different
collaborative and content filtering techniques. The information about willingness to pay is then
used to provide a personalized price for the customer.
In this paper, we use the term personalized pricing, or PP, to refer to the limiting case in
which a firm can implement a pricing policy based on complete knowledge of the willingness to
pay of each consumer.1 We bypass the question of how the firm acquires this knowledge. Rather,
we focus on the implications this has for firm strategies. Specifically, we examine the following
questions: (i) How does competition affect equilibrium product quality outcomes when firms engage
in personalized pricing? (ii) Does the improvement in firms’ knowledge of individual consumers
alleviate or intensify price competition? (iii) What are the tradeoffs firms face in adopting PP?
(iv) How does PP affect consumer welfare?
Examples of personalized pricing come from the markets for both consumer and business prod-
ucts. Firms selling large proprietary enterprise-level software often finalize the price through a
negotiation. Vendors typically work with clients to conduct an ROI (Return on Investment) analy-
sis to determine the benefit (in the form of cost savings or revenue enhancements) of the product
to the client. Sweeney et al., describe such a collaborative development of ROI by Teradata Inc.
in fostering sales of its data-warehousing technology.2 The ROI analysis is used to price software.
For instance, a California-based in-store demand planning software developer sets the price as a
percentage of a mutually determined ROI. This is also common practice in the sale of enterprise
telephone cost auditing software.3
1Since, the amount of information required for implementing PP is high, in practice, firms may not know valuations
precisely. Hence, our results should be interpreted as the solution to an important limiting case which provides a
useful benchmark – the case of perfect information.
2Sweeney, R., Davis, R. and M. Jeffery, “Teradata Data Mart Consolidation Return on Invest-
ment at GST”, 2002, http://www.kellogg.nwu.edu/faculty/jeffery/htm/cases/Data%20Mart% %20Consolida-
tion%20ROI%20Case%20at%20GST.pdf
3These anecdotes were communicated to us in conversations with Steve Acterman, Director Corporate IT Man-
agement, Volt Information Sciences, Harnish Kanani, Senior Vice President Global Services, Emagia Corporation,
Tim Johnson, Account Executive, Apreo Inc.
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The market for computer servers, storage devices and workstations in the Asia-Pacific region
combines PP and quality differentiation. Major players such as IBM, Hewlett Packard, and Sun
Microsystems use personalized discounting for different customers based on ROI, even at the same
quality levels. There is also a trend towards increasing the degree of service quality and value-added
software differentiation in the industry. For instance, in the UNIX platform, HP and IBM cater
to the high-end market, while Sun serves the low-end market.4 Other examples of value-based
personalized pricing are found in the healthcare (Smith and Nagle, 2002) and chemicals industries.
Online retailers with their ability to collect data are well-positioned to take advantage of dy-
namic pricing. In a well-known example, Amazon offered different prices to different consumers
on its popular DVD titles.5 Although Amazon’s experiment was short-lived due to a consumer
backlash, it has since found innovative ways of implementing PP without annoying consumers,
through the use of the “Gold Box”. Each consumer is provided access to a prominently displayed
Gold Box with their name (e.g. John Doe’s Gold Box) on webpages at Amazon. Opening the Gold
Box provides access to a limited number of products with special discounts that are not available
outside the Gold Box. The items offered in the Gold Box are different for different consumers.
This allows Amazon to charge personalized prices. This is an example of the continuing evolution
of PP and an indication of the likely use of such pricing by online retailers. Chen and Iyer (2002)
mention several other examples of customized pricing.6 Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) provide an
empirical study that compares several approaches for determining consumer willingness to pay.
We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly framework in which one or both firms can per-
fectly identify valuations of heterogenous consumers.7 A monopolist with such information could
engage in first-degree price discrimination. As Armstrong and Vickers (2001) point out, the lit-
erature on competitive price discrimination is not as extensive as in the monopoly case. They
provide an elegant framework that incorporates much of the earlier work on price competition in
4“Are Proprietary RISC Servers More Expensive Than Their UNIX Alternatives?”, TechWise Research, Incorpo-
rated, May 1999.
5Morneau, J., “Dynamic Pricing: Who Really Wins?,” TechWeb Sep. 29, 2000.
6These include major providers of long distance telephone service (such as AT&T, MCI and Sprint), direct mar-
keting companies like Land’s End and L.L. Bean, who have individual specific catalog prices, and financial services
and banks, who engage in PP through personalized discounts on card fees. Zhang (2003) mentions Wells Fargo and
MBNA in this regard.
7We ignore the possibility of mistargeting. Chen, Narasimhan and Zhang (2001) show that mistargeting can
have an important effect, by softening price competition in the market, and qualitatively changing the incentives for
competing firms engaged in individual marketing.
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an environment with multiple firms. Recent work on customer recognition and behavior-based
price discrimination includes Villas-Boas (1999) and Acquisti and Varian (2002). Much of the re-
cent work on perfect price discrimination has been done either in the context of horizontal product
differentiation (Vives and Thisse, 1988, Chen and Iyer, 2002, Ulph and Vulkan, 2002, Bhaskar and
To, 2002) or monopoly (Aron, Sunderarajan and Viswanathan, 2003). Shaffer and Zhang (2002)
consider perfect price discrimination by competing firms in a model that includes both horizontal
and vertical differentiation. Desai (2001) analyzes second-degree price discrimination with both
vertical and horizontal differentiation. Dellaert and Syam (2002) bring into focus the issues sur-
rounding mass-customization via an analysis of consumer-producer interaction. We contribute to
the literature in this field by incorporating perfect price discrimination in a vertically differenti-
ated duopolistic setting. Since our paper examines the issue of how firms’ knowledge of individual
customers affects the nature of their strategic interactions, it complements the work done on how
customers’ knowledge about firms may affect firms’ competitive strategies (Lal and Sarvary, 1999,
and Zettelmeyer, 2000).
We derive a number of analytical results on firm pricing, quality differentiation, and consumer
welfare when one or both firms have PP. First, if the firm with PP has a low quality, its optimal
price is non-monotonic in consumers’ willingness to pay. That is, some high valuation consumers
are offered lower prices than some low valuation ones. Second, when one firm adopts PP, the other
firm responds by lowering its price. This is a competitive response: a firm with PP knows the
valuation of each consumer, and can therefore charge prices as low as its own marginal cost to a
specific consumer. It therefore encroaches into the market share of the other firm, which responds
to the increased competition by reducing its price. Third, when only one of the firms adopts PP,
it is optimal for it to increase product differentiation. This can be interpreted as a move to reduce
competition with the other firm. When the cost of quality is quadratic, if the low quality firm
adopts PP, both firms reduce their quality levels. Conversely, when the high quality firm adopts
PP, both firms increase their quality levels. We show that when both firms adopt PP, the high
quality firm reduces its quality while the low quality firm raises its quality. Finally, consumer
surplus falls (compared to the no PP case) if the PP firm has low quality, but rises if the PP firm
has high quality. In fact, consumer surplus is highest when both firms have PP.
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In addition to the above results, for a wide range of cost parameters, we demonstrate some
properties of firm profit with PP. First, within this range, it is a dominant strategy for the low
quality firm to adopt PP. That is, regardless of whether the high quality firm adopts PP or not,
the low quality firm makes a higher profit with PP. Conversely, the high quality firm can actually
be worse off with PP and should adopt PP only if the costs of quality are not too steep. This
paradox emerges because in a vertical differentiation context, the other firm responds by lowering
its quality. Next, if marginal costs sharply increase in quality, then both firms earn lower profits
compared to the case where neither has PP. Essentially, they are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma.8
However, if costs are not too convex, both firms increase profits when they adopt PP. Thus, our
paper highlights that the cost-of-quality effect can lead to circumstances wherein firms can avoid
the prisoner’s dilemma situation when they both have PP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the model. In Section
3 we show that when only one firm has PP, there are two possible equilibria, with the PP firm
having either a low quality or a high quality.9 We next consider the case of both firms using PP.
In Section 4 we analyze the impact of PP on firms’ profits and consumer surplus. This allows us
to consider the question of when firms will adopt PP. We discuss some implications of our findings
in Section 5. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider personalized pricing in a duopoly model of vertical differentiation.10 Two firms compete
in both the quality and price of the products they offer. Formally, we model their competition as
a three-stage game. At the first stage, firms simultaneously choose the quality levels of their
products. At stage 2, the firms choose their prices. When neither firm has access to PP, prices
are chosen simultaneously. When only one firm has access to PP, the firm without PP chooses
its price first, followed by the firm with access to PP. Personalized pricing is executed for each
8Shaffer and Zhang (1995), Thisse and Vives(1988) obtain similar results in models of price discrimination.
9We do not consider the question of which equilibrium will emerge. In our model, neither firm has the option of
forcing the other into a particular equilibrium.
10Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986), building on research by Mussa and Rosen (1978),
develop duopoly models of vertical differentiation and show that to reduce price competition, firms seek maximal
product differentiation. Moorthy (1988) extends the basic model by incorporating variable production costs and
allowing consumers the opportunity to not buy a product. This results in less than maximal product differentiation.
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consumer at the point of sale. Hence, a firm which engages in PP chooses its price after a rival
that has a uniform pricing policy (which must be posted and committed to before sales occur). In
other words, the flexibility implied by personalized pricing incorporates an implicit assumption on
flexibility in timing as well. When both firms have PP, the order of moves at stage 2 does not affect
the outcome; for convenience, we again posit that prices are chosen simultaneously. Once prices
are chosen, at the last stage of the game (stage 3), consumers decide which, if any, product to buy.
If a consumer purchases a product of quality q at price p, his utility is U(θ) = θq − p, where
θ ∈ [0, 1]. A consumer has positive utility for one unit only. The type parameter θ indicates a
consumer’s marginal valuation for quality. For any given quality, a consumer with a higher θ is
willing to pay more for the product than one with a lower θ. If either of the two products offers
a positive net utility, a consumer buys the one that maximizes his surplus. Otherwise, he chooses
not to buy either product. It is immediate to show in this model that, if the qualities of the firms
are the same, personalized pricing adds no value—the result is Bertrand competition, with both
firms pricing at marginal cost. Hence, in this paper, we consider a model in which firms first choose
qualities (which will be different in equilibrium), and then prices.
Consistent with prior literature (for example, Desai, 2001), we assume that firms have a marginal
cost of production which is invariant with the quantity, but depends on the quality of the product.
That is, both firms have the same cost function, but depending on the quality levels they choose,
their marginal costs may differ in equilibrium. Each firm has a constant marginal cost for producing
the good, denoted by c. Further c(·) is twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex in
q. That is, c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0. Quality in this model is a broad notion that encompasses any feature
that may affect a consumer’s willingness to pay for a good. These could include features intrinsic
to the product itself (such as durability and functionality) or those related to the quality of the
shopping experience, or the service level provided by the firm (such as warranties and customer
service). Quality is observed perfectly by all consumers.
Given the quality levels and prices offered by the two firms, consumers make their choices.
Suppose, in the benchmark case of uniform pricing, firm 1 offers (q1, p1), and firm 2 offers (q2, p2).
There will be a subset of consumers (including null) who buy from each firm, 1 and 2. The profit of
firm j is its market coverage times (pj − c(qj)). In the case of PP, we allow one or both firms to be
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exogenously equipped with a technology that perfectly reveals the consumer’s type before the price
is disclosed to the consumer. Both firms know which firm has PP before the game is played. While
the firm offers the same quality product to all consumers, it can choose a personalized price for
each consumer. In this case, firm j’s profit from consumer θ is (pj(θ)− c(qj)). Let cj denote c(qj).
In practice, implementing personalized pricing may well incur some fixed costs. However, if such
costs are independent of the quality of the product being offered by the firm, they do not affect
the qualitative nature of the results. For simplicity, we treat these costs as zero.11 We consider
pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of this three-stage game. That is, for any strategies the
firms may choose at stages 1 and 2, consumers behave optimally at stage 3. Firms, in turn, not
only anticipate this behavior, but also choose optimal prices, given quality levels, at stage 2. The
subgame-perfect equilibrium is determined by backward induction, starting with stage 3.
Consider the case when neither firm has access to PP (we call this the no-PP case). As shown
by Moorthy (1988), in equilibrium at stage 3, the firms share the market in the following manner.12
There exist threshold consumers θ
h
and θ

, such that consumers with valuations greater than a
cutoff level θ
h
and less than 1 purchase product h, and those with valuations between a second
cutoff level θ

and θ
h
purchase product . This situation is depicted in Figure 1 below. The details
of the profit equations and reaction functions are provided in Section 1.1 of the Appendix.
0 1θ
h
θ

ffffff
Buy product hBuy product Buy neither product
Figure 1: Consumers’ purchasing decision by consumer type (θ)
The same intuition also applies in the case that one or both firms have PP. Of course, for the
equilibrium to have these properties with both firms existing, it must be that 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1. In
solving the various cases, we show that an equilibrium with these properties exists.
11In Section 4, we provide guidelines as to when firms should or should not invest in PP if the fixed costs are
non-zero.
12Moorthy assumes quadratic costs, but this result depends only on consumer preferences.
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3 Duopoly with Personalized Pricing
Suppose first that only one firm has PP. There are two equilibria in this case; one in which the PP
firm has a lower quality than the other firm, and a second one in which the PP firm has a higher
quality. We consider each of these, and then examine the case in which both firms have PP.
3.1 PP Firm Offers Low Quality
We use the superscript  to denote this case, while the subscripts h,  denote the firms. In the
spirit of backward induction, suppose firms choose qualities q
h
, q

at stage 1, and consider stage 2
first. Let p
h
, p

(θ) denote the optimal prices chosen at stage 2 (as functions of q
h
, q

). Similarly,
let πh

, π

denote the profit functions, as functions of q
h
and q

alone (that is, after substituting in
the optimal stage 2 prices). For brevity, in the notation we often suppress the dependence of these
functions on q
h
, q

(this dependence is clear in the expressions exhibited below). We use qh

and q

to denote equilibrium qualities chosen at stage 1. A notation guide is provided in the Appendix.
We restrict attention to qualities q that satisfy c(q) < q. The rationale for this is as follows:
the consumer with θ = 1 is the one who is willing to pay the most for a given product with quality
q. This consumer is willing to pay up to q for the product. If c(q) ≥ q, a firm cannot obtain a
positive market share unless it also makes a loss. Regardless of the quality it chooses at stage 1,
it can always prevent a loss by charging consumers a price p ≥ q, which ensures zero sales. Hence,
we only consider qualities with c(q) < q. Since the cost function is convex, it is sufficient to impose
this condition on the higher quality firm.
In this case, firm  knows the type of each consumer, and hence can offer prices that depend
on θ. It must be willing to offer a price as low as its marginal cost, c

= c(q

), to each consumer, if
necessary. Further, consistent with price discrimination, it will charge each consumer as high a price
as it can. At stage 3, firm h (which does not have PP) will operate in a market segment [θ
h
, 1], and
firm  in a market segment [θ

, θ
h
]. Consider first the location of the marginal consumer θ
h
, who
is indifferent between buying from either firm. This consumer must obtain the same utility from
either product. If p

(θ
h
) > c

, then firm  would lower its price for this consumer, to ensure that he
strictly prefers to buy product . Hence, it must be that p

(θ
h
) = c

. Therefore, this consumer is
defined by θ
h
q
h
−p
h
= θ
h
q

− c

, or θ
h
=
p
h
−c

q
h
−q

. For now, the qualities could be arbitrary, so define
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θ
h
= min{p

h
−c

q
h
−q

, 1}. Similarly, θ

is defined as the consumer who is indifferent between buying
product  and not consuming at all. Again, it must be that p

(θ

) = c

, else firm  could increase
its profit by reducing its price for this consumer. Hence, θ

q

− c

= 0 or θ

= cq

> 0. Finally, the
consumer who is exactly indifferent between not buying at all and buying from firm h is defined as
θˆ =
p
h
q
h
. At arbitrary qualities, it may be that this leads to θˆ > 1, so define θˆ = min{p

h
q
h
, 1}.
In the pricing subgame, we further restrict attention to prices that satisfy p ≥ c(q) for a given
quality q. No firm is willing to sell to consumers at a price less than its marginal cost (since this
results in a loss). However, for some qualities, there exist equilibria in the subgame at which firm
h may price below its cost, but makes zero sales. Firm h earns zero profits across these equilibria,
so we consider the equilibrium in which it prices no lower than its cost, c(q
h
).
Now, consider stage 2. Suppose firms have chosen qualities qh, q at stage 1. We show that, at
stage 2, the optimal price function of firm  is non-monotonic in consumer type; that is, it charges
some high valuation consumers less than it charges some low valuation consumers.
Proposition 1 Suppose firms choose any qualities q
h
and q

at stage 1, with associated costs
c
h
= c(qh) and c = c(q), that satisfy (i) q < qh and (ii) ch < qh. In the equilibrium of the pricing
subgame starting at stage 2, we have 0 < θ

< θ
h
≤ 1. Further,
(a) firm h sets a price p
h
= max{12 (qh − q + ch + c) , ch}
(b) firm  sets a price p

(θ) that is non-monotonic in a consumer’s valuation θ, such that some
higher valuation consumers obtain lower prices than some lower valuation ones. Specifically,
p

(θ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
θq

if θ ∈ [θ

, θˆ]
p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

) if θ ∈ (θˆ, θ
h
]
c

if θ ∈ [0, θˆ) or θ ∈ (θ
h
, 1].
This situation is depicted in Figure 2. The intuition is that in the market segment [0, θˆ], firm
 faces no competition from firm h. These consumers are not willing to buy product h at the
offered quality and price. Hence, firm  is able to extract their entire consumer surplus. However,
consumers in the range [θˆ, 1] obtain a positive utility from consuming product h as well. Hence,
firm  faces competition in this range, and must offer consumers at least as high a surplus as firm
h, to induce them to buy product . Thus, the threat of latent competition from firm h provides
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these consumers with a positive surplus that is monotonically increasing in their valuations.
  















p

(θ)
p
h
0 1
c

θ

θ
h
θˆ
ff  ff 

Firm ′s market Firm h′s market
Prices of , h
Figure 2: Prices of firms  and h when firm  alone has PP
Now, consider the choice of qualities at stage 1. In Lemma 1 in the appendix, we show that at
the equilibrium qualities, given the prices exhibited in Proposition 1, the threshold consumer types
satisfy 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1. Hence, we ignore the Kuhn-Tucker constraints implied by these conditions,
and focus on the interior solution.
Suppose firm  chooses q

, and firm h chooses q
h
. Further, suppose both firms choose optimal
prices (as given by Proposition 1), given the two qualities. Then, the profit functions of the two
firms are:
π

(q
h
, q

) =
∫ θˆ
θ

(θq

− c

)dθ +
∫ θ
h
θˆ
(p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)− c

)dθ =
(p
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)q
h
q

(1)
π
h
(q
h
, q

) = (p
h
− c
h
) (1− θ
h
(p
h
, q
h
, c

, q

)) =
(q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(2)
When firm  adopts PP, the competitive response of firm h is to reduce its price. This is the
“price competition effect.” PP allows firm  to set a price as low as marginal cost for a particular
consumer, to induce him to buy product . This leads to an immediate increase in the market
coverage of firm , both amongst low valuation consumers, and those who were previously buying
product h. In response to this heightened competition from firm , firm h strategically reduces
its price. This response of firm h, in turn, induces firm  to lower its own quality, to reduce the
competition with firm h and tap some more uncontested marginal consumers on the left. We
demonstrate these effects in Lemma 2 of the Appendix, which also derives the reaction functions
for the two firms.
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Of course, in equilibrium, both firms change their qualities from the no-PP case. If the cost
function is quadratic, we show that both firms reduce their qualities.
Proposition 2 Suppose the cost function is quadratic; that is, c(q) = Aq2. In equilibrium, when
firm  adopts PP, both firms reduce their qualities compared to the no-PP case. In particular,
q
h
= 0.388A and q


= 0.164A .
Since analytic solutions are infeasible in the general case, we numerically solve for qualities using
a cost function c(q) = qα, where α > 1. In the numeric solution, we check that the constraints
0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1 are satisfied for each α (so that each firm has a positive market share in all cases).
The results are shown in Figure 3.13 If the cost function is not too convex (in particular, α ≤ 1.2),
firm h chooses a higher quality in equilibrium. Conversely, if the cost function is highly convex
(α > 1.2), it chooses a lower quality.
The intuition for this is as follows. PP allows firm  to charge a price as low as its cost c

. This
lets it penetrate an untapped market segment with lower valuations than it is currently serving,
as well as make some headway into the market served by firm h. This is the “market coverage
effect.” Firm h has two competitive responses to this. First, as a result of the price competition
effect, it reduces its price. Second, when costs are sufficiently convex, it reduces its quality. By
moving towards the low quality firm, h increases the uncontested portion of its market. This
further induces firm  to reduce its own quality, to mitigate the more aggressive competition from
firm h. However, if costs are almost linear (i.e., for low values of α), firm h increases its quality
in equilibrium, and increases its price. Though this entails a lower market coverage, the nature of
the cost function implies that the profit per unit sold is higher. This “cost of quality effect” is also
critical in determining the new equilibrium qualities and prices.
3.2 PP Firm Offers High Quality
We use the superscript h to denote this case. In this case, firm h knows the type of each consumer,
and hence is willing to price as low as ph
h
(θ) = c
h
if need be.14 The threshold consumer θ
h
obtains
13A description of the technique used to solve for the equilibrium in the no-PP case is contained in the Technical
Appendix.
14Again, for brevity, we suppress the dependence of the optimal price functions ph
h
, ph

on qh , q .
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the same utility from either product.15 If ph
h
(θ
h
) > c

, then firm  would lower its price for this
consumer, to ensure that he strictly prefers to buy product . Hence, it must be that ph
h
(θ
h
) = c

.
Therefore, this consumer is defined by θ
h
=
c
h
−ph

q
h
−q

. Similarly, θ

is defined by the consumer
indifferent between buying product  and not consuming at all. Hence, θ

=
ph

q

. In contrast to the
low-PP case, when firm h adopts PP, it charges a price monotonic in consumer valuations.
Proposition 3 Suppose firms choose any qualities q
h
> q

at stage 1, with associated costs c
h
=
c(q
h
) and c

= c(q

), that satisfy (i) q

< q
h
and (ii) c
h
< q
h
. In the equilibrium of the pricing
subgame starting at stage 2, we have 0 < θ

< θ
h
≤ 1. Further,
(a) the optimal price of firm  is lower than c
h
, the marginal cost of firm h. Specifically, firm  sets
ph

=
⎧⎨
⎩
1
2 (c +
q

q
h
c
h
) if 12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chq
h
) ≤ 1
min{c
h
− (q
h
− q

), c+q2 } otherwise.
(b) over the market it serves, firm h charges an optimal price monotonically increasing in consumer
valuations. Specifically, firm h sets
ph
h
(θ) =
{
c
h
if θ ∈ [0, θ
h
]
1
2(c +
q

q
h
c
h
) + θ(q
h
− q

) if θ ∈ (θ
h
, 1].
Firm h charges a monotonically increasing price because it faces no competitive threat from
firm  in the region [θ
h
, 1]. Interestingly, firm ′s price is lower than even the marginal cost of firm
h, i.e., ph

< c
h
. This pricing policy enables it to serve a sizable segment of the market, despite
being a low quality firm and not having PP.
Now consider the choice of qualities of stage 1. Incorporating the optimal stage 2 prices leads
to the following profit functions for the firms:
πh

(q
h
, q

) = (θ
h
− θ

)(ph

− c

) =
(c
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2q
h
q

(q
h
− q

)
(3)
πh
h
(q
h
, q

) =
∫ 1
θ
h
(ph
h
(θ)− c
h
)dθ =
(ph

+ q
h
− q

− c
h
)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(4)
In this case, too, the price-competition effect works in the same direction: the firm that does
not have PP (here, firm ) reduces its price to compete more effectively. In response to this “price-
competition effect,” firm h raises its quality. We demonstrate this in Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
15As in the low-PP case, we solve for an interior solution, with 0 < θ < θh < 1. We show in Lemma 3 in the
Appendix that the equilibrium must satisfy this condition.
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Of course, in equilibrium, both firms change their qualities from the no-PP case. We first
demonstrate that, with quadratic costs, both firms raise their qualities.
Proposition 4 Suppose the cost function is quadratic; that is, c(q) = Aq2. In equilibrium, when
firm h adopts PP, both firms raise their qualities, compared to the no-PP case. In particular,
qh
h
= 0.444A and q
h

= 0.222A .
However, this is not true for all degrees of convexity of the cost function. As in the low-PP
case, if the cost function is not too convex (in particular, α ≤ 1.55), firm  chooses a lower quality
in equilibrium. Conversely, if the cost function is highly convex (α > 1.55), it chooses a higher
quality (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Equilibrium qualities of firms h (top) and  (bottom) with c(q) = qα.
Thus, for a wide range of α, both firms increase their qualities compared to the no-PP case.
Here, the market coverage effect benefits firm h, which can penetrate into the market of firm .
The competitive response of firm  takes two dimensions: it reduces its price (the price-competition
effect), and also increases its quality (to come closer to firm h). This, in turn, induces firm h to
increase its own quality, to avoid head-to-head competition. As in the low-PP case, if costs are
close to linear (i.e., for low values of α), the firm without PP moves further away in quality. That
is, firm  reduces its quality, with a corresponding reduction in price. This results in lower market
coverage, but a higher profit per unit, due to the cost-of-quality effect. Therefore, starting from
the no-PP case, if the cost function is convex enough, the non-PP firm seeks to reduce quality
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differentiation and come closer to the PP firm in the quality space. That is, if the PP firm has a
low quality, in equilibrium both firms end up with lower qualities than previously. The converse
outcome occurs if the PP firm chooses high quality; that is, both firms end up with higher qualities.
Further, the firm without PP offers a lower price than the corresponding price in the no-PP case.
3.3 Both Firms have PP
We denote this case with the superscript b. Suppose the firms choose qualities q
h
and q

at stage 1.
Then, θ
h
= ch−cq
h
−q

, θ

= cq

, and θˆ = chq
h
. Recall that firm h sells to consumers in the region [θ
h
, 1]
and firm  in the region [θ

, θ
h
]. As in the low-PP case, θˆ represents the point beyond which firms
compete for consumers, so that consumers in the region [θ

, θˆ] are not willing to buy good h at any
price c
h
or higher.16
Consider stage 2 of this game, where the firms choose their price schedule, given qualities q
h
, q

.
Let pb
h
(θ) be the optimal price charged by firm h to the consumer of type θ. This is the price at
which he is exactly indifferent between buying the low quality product at c

(the lowest price firm
 is willing to charge) and the high quality product h at pb
h
(θ). Therefore, θq
h
− pb
h
(θ) = θq

− c

,
or pb
h
(θ) = c

+ θ(q
h
− q

). As in the high-PP case, this price is strictly increasing in θ.
Consider the price charged by firm . The pricing function is similar to the one in the low-PP
case, with the one difference that firm h is willing to price as low as c
h
to any consumer. Hence,
the optimal price function for firm  is pb

(θ) = θq

for θ ∈ [θ

, θˆ] and pb

(θ) = c
h
− θ
h
(q
h
− q

) for
θ ∈ [θˆ, θ
h
]. As before, in the latter region, the price of firm  is declining in a consumer’s willingness
to pay. Stepping back to stage 1, we incorporate the optimal stage 2 prices into the firms’ profit
functions to obtain
πb
h
(q
h
, q

) =
∫ 1
θ
h
(c

+ θ(q
h
− q

)− c
h
)dθ =
(q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(5)
πb

(q
h
, q

) =
∫ θˆ
θ

(θq

− c

)dθ +
∫ θ
h
θˆ
(c
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)− c

)dθ =
(c
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2q
h
q

(q
h
− q

)
. (6)
Comparing equations (23) and (12), we observe that the profit function of firm h, when both firms
have PP, is exactly the same as in the case when only firm  has PP. Hence, h′s reaction function in
the two cases is the same as well. Similarly, comparing equations (24) and (18), the profit function
of firm , when both firms have PP, is exactly the same as in the case when only firm h has PP.
16We show in the proof of Proposition 5 that the equilibrium satisfies 0 < θ < θh < 1.
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Hence, ′s reaction function in the two cases is the same as well. The analysis of the previous two
cases can now be directly used when both firms have PP.
We show that when both firms have PP, both firms choose a lower quality than when only firm
h has PP. Notice that this result does not depend on additional restrictions on the cost function.
In comparing the qualities to the case when only firm  has PP, we find that both qualities are
higher when the cost function is convex enough, but lower when the cost function is not too convex.
Numerically, for the function c(q) = qα, when α > 1.3, both qualities are higher than in the low-PP
case. We analytically prove this latter result for the quadratic cost function.
Proposition 5 Consider the case in which both firms have PP.
(i) In equilibrium, both firms offer a lower quality than in the case where only firm h has PP. That
is, qb
h
< qh
h
and qb

< qh

.
(ii) Suppose the cost function is quadratic, so c(q) = Aq2. Then, in equilibrium, both firms offer a
higher quality than in the case where only firm  has PP. That is, qb
h
= 0.4A > q

h
and qb

= 0.2A > q


.
When costs are quadratic, compared to the case when neither firm had PP, in equilibrium the
high quality firm lowers its quality and the low quality firm raises its quality. Thus, both firms
actually come closer to each other in quality. A subtle consequence of both firms having PP is that
the increase in pricing flexibility levels the playing field. Since both firms can now price at marginal
cost for the threshold customer, the price competition effect leads to intensified competition for
market share. Further, both have an incentive to compete more aggressively, so the relative product
differentiation between the two firms decreases, which in turn increases the market coverage of each
firm. But, for increasingly convex cost structures, the additional burden of the cost-of-quality effect
leaves both firms worse off. The intensified price competition implies that consumers are better off.
4 Firm Profits and Consumer Surplus
In this section, we examine which firms are likely to adopt PP, and the resultant consumer welfare.
Suppose neither firm has PP. We assume that after one or both firms adopt PP, the quality rankings
of the firms do not change. That is, the low quality firm, when neither firm had PP, remains the low
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quality firm when one or both firms have PP. Quality levels are tantamount to brand equity, and
significant changes to quality are likely to be costly. This is especially true when quality rankings
are reversed. By contrast, local or marginal changes to quality can be made in a continuous fashion.
Hence, we now consider firm  acquiring PP, or firm h acquiring PP, or both. First, consider the
quadratic cost case, with c(q) = Aq2. In Table 1, we exhibit equilibria under different settings for
this case.
Neither firm has PP Low-PP case High-PP case Both firms have PP
Firm h  h  h  h 
Quality 0.410/A 0.199/A 0.388/A 0.164/A 0.444/A 0.222/A 0.4/A 0.2/A
Market Coverage 0.279 0.345 0.224 0.612 0.444 0.222 0.4 0.4
Average Price 0.227/A 0.075/A 0.201/A 0.056/A 0.247/A 0.074/A 0.2/A 0.06/A
Profit 0.016/A 0.012/A 0.011/A 0.018/A 0.022/A 0.006/A 0.016/A 0.008/A
Cons. Surplus 0.047/A 0.045/A 0.049/A 0.12/A
Table 1: Summary of equilibrium results when c(q) = Aq2
The consumer surplus shown above is defined in each of the four cases as
CS =
∫ θ
h
θ

(θq

− p

(θ))dθ +
∫ 1
θ
h
(θq
h
− p
h
(θ))dθ,
where p

(θ) and p
h
(θ) are, respectively, the prices paid in equilibrium by a consumer of type θ
buying good  and good h.17 For example, in the case when the PP firm has low quality, we have
p
h
(θ) = p
h
, which is independent of θ, and p

(θ) = p

(θ), as given in Proposition 1.
Notice that the results in the case when neither firm has PP correspond exactly to those of
Moorthy (1991). The average price displayed in the table is the average of the prices paid by
different consumers for the good. In the case when neither firm has PP, all consumers pay the same
price. When both firms have PP, due to the intensified competition, the average price of both firms
is the lowest across all cases. Further, the overall market coverage is at its highest. Hence, CS is
maximized in this case.
As Table 1 shows, both firms have an incentive to adopt PP when costs are quadratic, regardless
of whether the other firm also has PP. However, the firms are trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: if
both firms adopt PP, their profits are each lower than in the no-PP case. Even though there is a
market coverage effect which boosts market share, the deleterious impact of the price competition
effect is that the average price of each sale is lower. Further, due to the cost-of-quality effect the
17Since this CS expression applies to each of the four cases, we omit the superscript on prices and qualities.
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profits dip, leaving both firms worse off as a result. We summarize the quadratic case as follows.
The proof follows directly by comparison across the columns in Table 1.
Proposition 6 Suppose costs are quadratic, so c(q) = Aq2. Then,
(i) if one firm alone adopts PP, its profit increases, compared to the case when neither firm has
PP. However, if both firms have PP, each firm has lower profits than in the no-PP case.
(ii) consumer surplus (CS) is highest when both firms have PP. Further, it is higher when only firm
h has PP, compared to the cases when either firm  alone or neither firm has PP.
Next, consider the case c(q) = qα, where α > 1. As before, we numerically compare equilibria
across the different cases. We find that consumer surplus remains highest in the case when both
firms have PP. This points out the benefits of competition when there is perfect price discrimination,
in contrast to the scenario where there is only a monopolist, which results in zero CS.18
Observation 1 For all α > 1, consumer surplus is higher when both firms have PP, as compared
to any of the other cases.
When both firms have PP, firm h charges a price pb
h
(θ) = c

+ θ(q
h
− q

) to its consumers.
Compare this to the price it charges when firm  does not have PP: ph
h
(θ) = ph

+ θ(q
h
− q

). If
firm  now adopts PP, the greater competition leads to a lower price for consumers of firm h, and
a corresponding increase in welfare. Consumer surplus (CS) falls, compared to the no personalized
pricing case, if the PP firm has low quality, but rises if the PP firm has high quality. When firm 
has PP, it extends its market reach to a segment previously untapped, since it can price as low as
marginal cost. However, a segment of firm ′s consumers receive no surplus, since they pay a price
exactly equal to their willingness to pay. Conversely, if firm h has PP, it faces competition from
firm  throughout its market segment, and is forced to concede some surplus to consumers.
Observation 2 For α ∈ [1, 4], it is a dominant strategy for firm  to adopt PP. That is, regardless
of whether firm h has PP, firm  should adopt PP.
Figure 4 demonstrates the increase in profit to firm  when it adopts PP. The figure on the
18Bhaskar and To (2002) obtain similar results in their framework.
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left illustrates the case of neither firm having PP, and the figure on the right, the case of firm h
having PP. We emphasize that the cost of acquiring a resource to enable personalized pricing is not
factored into this calculation. Such a cost can be incorporated as follows. The vertical gap between
the dashed and solid line indicates the gain to firm  from PP. It will adopt PP if and only if this
gap exceeds the fixed cost of adopting PP.
Figure 4: Profit of Firm  when Firm h does not (left) and does (right) have PP
Observation 3 Regardless of whether firm  has PP, firm h should adopt PP only if the cost
function is not too convex. In particular, there exists an αˆ ∈ [2.5, 3] such that, if α > αˆ, and firm
h adopts PP, its profits decrease.
Figure 5 demonstrates this result. How can the profit of firm h decrease when it adopts PP?
Recall that, when firm h adopts PP and firm  does not have PP, firm  responds by reducing its
price. This induces firm h to increase its quality. Increasing quality is especially costly when the
cost function is steep; indeed, it is costly enough in this case to outweigh the benefits of charging
consumers according to their willingness to pay. A similar intuition holds when firm  has PP. If
firm h adopts PP in this situation, the new equilibrium sees both firms at a higher quality, which
is correspondingly costly for firm h. Again, note that this result does not factor in a cost for
implementing PP. With such a cost, firm h has even less incentive to adopt PP. Together, these
results imply the following.
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Figure 5: Profit of Firm h when Firm  does not (left) and does (right) have PP
Observation 4 Personalized Pricing by both firms need not lead to a prisoner’s dilemma situation
in which all firms are worse off. If both firms adopt PP, then, for a lower level of convexity of
the cost function, both firms have higher profits compared to the case when neither firm has PP.
However, the market shares increase for both firms, for all α.
The result on profits can be seen by comparing the profits of the two firms in Figures 4 and
5, between the cases “Neither firm has PP” and “Both firms have PP.” PP increases the pricing
flexibility of both firms. An obvious consequence of this is more intense price competition. However,
since the firms also respond by strategically changing qualities, the cost-of-quality effect plays a
crucial role in determining the net change in profits. This ensures that personalized pricing does
not invariably lead to a prisoner’s dilemma.
5 Managerial Implications and Conclusion
The practice of personalized pricing is important in both offline and online channels. Our results
show that an appropriate pricing strategy must take into account both consumers’ willingness
to pay and competition in a particular market segment. Ignoring either one can result in lower
profits. In our model, if the low quality firm deploys PP, it is optimal for it to use a non-monotonic
price schedule. Thus, some high valuation consumers are charged lower prices than some lower
valuation consumers. An example of such pricing comes from the hardware industry for RISC/NT
servers and high end workstations wherein, it is quite common to charge different prices to different
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customers, for the same quality and same quantity. Large customers are able to extract huge
discounts, despite valuing the product very highly. On the other hand, smaller enterprises obtain
lower discounts because no other firm competes for their demand (since the profit margins are much
lower). In the latter segment, manufacturers often price according to the customers’ willingness
to pay and in the process, capture most of their surplus. Consequently, they are able to extract
higher profits from some under-contested customers. Conversely, their margins are also squeezed
by some large customers who play the firms against each other and win price concessions.
Our model also sheds light on the different product quality choices made by firms, given that
one or both firms implement PP. When a low quality firm adopts PP, both firms reduce their
quality levels in equilibrium. In the IT hardware industry, this is often done through stripping off
some value-added customer service, such as next-day on-site repair versus same-day 8-hour repair,
or a 99%-uptime guarantee versus 99.95%.19 Conversely, if the high quality firm adopts PP, both
firms should augment the quality levels of their offerings by providing additional product features
or services. For instance, HP differentiates itself by providing higher quality, new generation web-
based applications, as well as clustering and security management software embedded in the same
hardware box.20
The critical issue for managers in vertically differentiated industries to keep in mind in adopting
PP is the interplay between two countervailing effects: increased market coverage and intensified
competition, given the convexity of the cost function. The increase in market coverage makes PP
attractive. However, aggravated price competition hurts firms’ profits. Further, optimal qualities
of firms change. Therefore, the net effect of PP also depends on the nature of the cost function.
For a lower level of convexity of the cost function, both firms have higher profits compared to
the case when neither firm has PP and hence, are able to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma situation.
With moderately convex costs, α ∈ [1.5, 3], both low and high quality firms have an incentive to
adopt PP, regardless of the other firm’s actions. However, both firms are better off in the scenario
where neither has PP, as compared to both having PP, resulting in a prisoner’s dilemma situation.
Conversely, if α > 3, only the low quality firm will adopt PP, since the high quality firm reduces
its own profit by adopting PP.
19The cost difference to the consumer between, say, a 99%-uptime guarantee and a 99.95% guarantee is substantial,
so this difference is non-trivial.
20See http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/execteam/speeches/fiorina/oracleapps 02.html.
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Finally, our model also demonstrates that consumers would benefit if higher quality firms adopt
PP. In the event that all firms adopt PP, consumers would benefit the most. Thus we conclude
that, in a competitive scenario, increasing knowledge about consumers’ willingness to pay should
eventually lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare.
One limitation of our paper is that we only consider a single product offering by each firm,
whereas in practice firms often offer multiple products. In the extreme case, one can conceive of
firms offering a personalized quality to each consumer, in addition to a personalized price. If both
firms have the ability to customize product quality at no additional cost, Bertrand competition
for each consumer is inevitable, and both firms will be held to zero profit. Hence, a proper study
of customization must therefore incorporate additional features not considered in our model, such
as horizontal differentiation (Ulph and Vulkan, 2002) or differences in the customization ability of
firms (Dellaert and Syam, 2002).
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6 Appendix
Guide to Notation
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Variable Interpretation
Firm h, Firm  High quality and Low quality firm, respectively.
q
h
, q

Generic qualities of firm h and firm , respectively.
c
h
, c

Costs of firm h and firm , at respective qualities q
h
and q

.
θ
h
, θ

Generic market coverage cut-offs of firm h and firm , respectively.
pn
h
, pn

Optimal price functions of firm h and firm , when neither firm has PP.
p
h
, p

(θ) Optimal price functions of firm h and firm , when PP firm has low quality.
ph
h
(θ), ph

Optimal price functions of firm h and firm , when PP firm has high quality.
pb
h
(θ), pb

(θ) Optimal price functions of firm h and firm , when both firms have PP.
qn
h
, qn

Equilibrium qualities of firm h and firm , when neither firm has PP.
q
h
, q

Equilibrium qualities of firm h and firm , when PP firm has low quality.
qh
h
, qh

Equilibrium qualities of firm h and firm , when PP firm has high quality.
qb
h
, qb

Equilibrium qualities of firm h and firm , when both firms have PP.
πn
h
, πn

Profit functions of firms h and , when neither firm has PP.
π
h
, π

Profit functions of firms h and , when PP firm has low quality.
πh
h
, πh

Profit functions of firms h and , when PP firm has high quality.
πb
h
, πb

Profit functions of firms h and , when both firms have PP firm.
Table 2: Guide to Notation
6.1 Neither Firm has PP
We briefly exhibit the closed form expressions for prices and profits when neither firm has PP.
These expressions are used to numerically solve the model with the cost function c(q) = qα, with
α varying.
Suppose the firms have chosen qualities q
h
, q

at the first stage. Consider the optimal price
functions at the second stage. Assume that the constraints 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1 are satisfied (in
equilibrium, these constraints are satisfied numerically in the solutions we exhibit for all α > 1).
As Moorthy (1988) has shown, here θ
h
is defined by the consumer exactly indifferent between
products h and , and is given by θ
h
q
h
− pn
h
= θ
h
q

− pn

, so θ
h
=
pn
h
−pn

q
h
−q

. Similarly, θ

is defined by
the consumer indifferent between product  and not consuming at all, which yields θ

=
pn

q

.
Now, the profit of firm h is π
h
= (1 − p
n
h
−pn

q
h
−q

)(pn
h
− c
h
). Differentiating with respect to p
h
and
setting the derivative equal to zero, we have 2pn
h
− pn

= q
h
− q

+ c
h
. The second derivative is
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−2
q
h
−q

< 0, so we have a maximum.
Similarly, the profit of firm  is π

= (
pn
h
−pn

q
h
−q

− p
n

q

) (pn

− c

). Differentiating with respect to p

and setting the derivative equal to zero, we have −pn
h
q

+2pn

q
h
= c

q
h
. The second order condition
for maximization is satisfied as −2qhq
h
−q

< 0. The optimal price functions at stage 2, (pn
h
, pn

), are
found by simultaneously solving the two first-order conditions, which yields
pn
h
=
q
h
(2(q
h
− q

) + c

+ 2c
h
)
4q
h
− q

. (7)
pn

=
q
h
(q

+ 2c

) + q

(c
h
− q

)
4q
h
− q

. (8)
From these prices the profit functions can be derived and are given by
πn
h
(q
h
, q

) =
c
h
(−2q
h
+ q

) + q
h
(2q
h
− 2q

+ c

)2
(q
h
− q

)(4q
h
− q

)2
. (9)
πn

(q
h
, q

) =
q
h
(
q

(q
h
− q

+ c
h
) + (c

(−2q
h
+ q

)2)
)
q

(q
h
− q

)(4q
h
− q

)2
. (10)
Now, the equilibrium qualities at stage 1 are solved for in the usual way; differentiating each
profit function with respect to the quality of that firm yields a reaction function, and the equilibrium
qualities must simultaneously satisfy both reaction functions.
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6.2 PP Firm Offers Low Quality
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose firms have chosen qualities q
h
, q

at stage 1 that satisfy q

< q
h
and c
h
< q
h
, where
c
h
= c(q
h
) and c

= c(q

). Consider the pricing subgame that starts at stage 2.
Firm  will set its price for each consumer, p

(θ), as high as possible to satisfy two restrictions:
(i) the consumer buys product  instead of product h, and (ii) the consumer buys product , rather
than not consume at all. These conditions imply
θq

− p

(θ) ≥ θq
h
− p
h
or p

(θ) ≤ p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)
θq

− p

(θ) ≥ 0, or p

(θ) ≤ θq

.
Further, firm  must set p

(θ) ≥ c

= c

(q

) for each consumer, or else it makes a loss on
that consumer, and would prefer not to sell to him. Hence, we have p

(θ) ≥ c

, and p

(θ) ≤
min{θq

, p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)}. In the second inequality, p

(θ) ≤ θq

follows from the fact that the
consumer’s reservation utility is zero. Further, p

(θ) < p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

) can be interpreted as an
incentive compatibility constraint for the consumer: if this is violated, he buys product h instead.
By definition, θ
h
= min{p

h
−c

q
h
−q

, 1}. Hence, the profit of firm h, if it charges price p
h
, is
π
h
= (1−θ
h
) (p
h
−c
h
) = (1− p

h
−c

q
h
−q

) (p
h
−c
h
). First, suppose that θ
h
< 1. The first-order condition
for profit-maximization, ∂πh
∂p
h
= 0, directly yields its optimal price p
h
= 12 (qh − q + ch + c). Given
this price for firm h, we have θ
h
= min{p

h
−c

q
h
−q

, 1} = min{ qh−q+ch−c2(q
h
−q

) , 1}. Clearly, θh > 0.
Further, θ
h
< 1 if and only if c
h
− c

< q
h
− q

. In this case, all conditions for profit-maximization
by firm h are satisfied (the second derivative of the profit function is easily checked), and we can
ignore the boundary conditions on θ
h
.
Suppose, instead, that c
h
− c

≥ q
h
− q

. Then, if firm h continues to price at p
h
= 12 (qh − q +
c
h
+ c

), we have p
h
≤ c
h
and θ
h
= 1. Since θ
h
= 1, firm h has no sales, so its profits are zero. As
long as θ
h
= 1, any price charged by firm h remains a best response. From this set of prices, we
set p
h
= c
h
, the marginal cost of firm h. Note that at this price, the condition θ
h
= 1 is satisfied,
since c
h
− c

≥ q
h
− q

.
Now, consider θˆ =
p
h
q
h
. Given the price postulated for firm h, and that c
h
< q
h
(by assumption),
it is immediate that θˆ < 1. Further, p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

) > θq

for θ > θˆ, and p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

) < θq

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for θ < θˆ. The pricing function for firm  now follows for consumers in the range θ ∈ [θ

, θ
h
].
Consumers outside this range are unwilling to purchase product  even at the price c

; to these
consumers, firm  charges a price equal to c

.
We have already shown that θ
h
≤ 1. Now θ

= cq

, and since c
h
< q
h
, it must be that c

< q

(by convexity of the cost function c(·)). Hence, 0 < θ

< 1. Finally, we need to show that θ

< θ
h
.
If θ
h
= 1, this is immediate. Hence, suppose that θ
h
< 1; as shown earlier, this can happen only if
c
h
− c

< q
h
− q

. In this case, θ
h
= qh−q+ch−c2(q
h
−q

) .
Now, convexity of the cost function implies that ch−cq
h
−q

>
c

q

when q
h
> q

. Hence,
1 +
c
h
− c

q
h
− q

>
c

q

+
c

q

q
h
− q

+ c
h
− c

q
h
− q

> 2
c

q

θ
h
=
q
h
− q

+ c
h
− c

2(q
h
− q

)
>
c

q

= θ

.
Lemma 1 In the equilibrium of the whole game, 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1.
Proof: Suppose firms have chosen their equilibrium quality levels at period 1. Then, it cannot be
that q

= q
h
= 0 (since at least one firm would choose a positive quality and earn a positive profit).
Without loss of generality, assume q
h
> 0 and c
h
< q
h
. Then there exists a q

∈ (0, q
h
) such that
firm  earns a positive profit. From Proposition 1, it follows that 0 < θ

< θ
h
≤ 1.
Now, we show that θ
h
< 1 in the equilibrium of the whole game. The argument runs as follows.
We show that, in equilibrium, c′(q

) < 1. This will imply that there exists a q
h
such that firm h
makes a positive profit, which further implies that θ
h
< 1 (since firm h earns a zero profit if θ
h
= 1).
Let c′

denote c′(q

). Suppose c′

≥ 1. Also, suppose that θ
h
= 1. Then, from Proposition 1, it
must be that c
h
− c

≥ q
h
− q

. Suppose first that ch−cqh−q = 1. Then, given its pricing scheme, the
revenue of firm  is obtained as the area of the triangle in Figure 2. As shown, the price of firm 
is linear in q. Hence, its average price pˆ =
∫ θh
θ
p

(θ)dθ is also linear in . Further, since only the
consumer with θ = 1 is willing to pay q

, we can write this average price as pˆ = βq

, where β < 1.
Now, the profit of firm  can be written as π = (θh− θ)(βq− c(q)). Consider a small change
in q. The second term (βq − c(q)) denotes the profit per unit sold; this increases when q falls,
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since its derivative is β − c

, where β < 1 ≤ c′

.
Consider the first term, which denotes the market coverage. θ = cq , which falls when q falls.
Also, since θh = ch−cqh−q , we have
∂θh
∂q
= ch−c−c
′
(qh−q)
(qh−q)2 =
1−c′
qh−q since ch −c = qh −q . Hence
∂θh
∂q
≤ 0
when c′ ≥ 1. That is, if q falls slightly, firm  still sells all the way up to θ = 1. So, if q falls, both
terms in π increase. Hence, it cannot be that θh = 1 and c′(q) ≥ 1.
Finally, if ch−cqh−q > 1, it follows even more strongly that c
′(q

) < 1, since the market coverage of
firm  improves, and its profit per unit also improves.
Hence, it must be that c′

< 1. Now, suppose firm h chooses a quality q

+ . For  > 0 small
enough, c
h
− c

≈ c′

 < q
h
− q

= . Hence, there exists an  > 0 such that c
h
− c

< q
h
− q

, which
implies p
h
> c
h
. Substituting the value of p
h
= qh−q+ch+c2 , we have p

h
= 12(1 +
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

), which
implies θ
h
< 1. Hence, there exists a q
h
such that firm h makes a positive profit. Hence, it will
never choose a q
h
such that θ
h
= 1.
Therefore, in the equilibrium of the whole game, 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1.
6.2.1 Derivation of Reaction Functions
We show (as an aside; this is used in Proof of Proposition 5) that the reaction functions are upward
sloping.
Lemma 2 (i) The reaction functions of both firms are upward-sloping in the range of quality such
that c′(q

) < 1.
(ii) Suppose both firms offer the no-PP qualities, qn
h
, qn

, and firm  now adopts PP. Then, compared
to the no-PP case: (a) if firms remain at their original qualities, qn
h
, qn

, the optimal defensive
strategy of firm h is to charge a lower price (b) Compared to the no-PP case, if firm h remains at
its original quality, qn
h
, then the optimal strategy of firm  is to lower its quality.
Proof of Lemma 2
(i) We first derive the reaction functions of the two firms. As shown in equations (1) and (2) of the
text, the profit functions of the firms in this case are
π

(q
h
, q

) =
∫ θˆ
θ

(θq

− c

)dθ +
∫ θ
h
θˆ
(p
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)− c

)dθ =
(p
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)q
h
q

(11)
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π
h
(q
h
, q

) = (p
h
− c
h
) (1− θ
h
(p
h
, q
h
, c

, q

)) =
(q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(12)
We focus on an interior equilibrium with 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1. We restrict attention to qualities
such that c′(q

) < 1 because we have shown that the equilibrium qualities satisfy this restriction.
The reaction functions are valid for all qualities in this range: as shown in the proof of Lemma 1, if
c′(q

) < 1, there exist qualities q
h
at which firm h can earn a positive profit (and therefore θ
h
< 1).
The first-order condition of firm  is
∂π

∂q

= 0. Recognizing that the optimal price of firm h, p
h
,
is a function of q

(from Proposition 1), we have
(p
h
q

− c

q
h
)(c

q
h
(q
h
− 2q

) + q

(p
h
q
h
− (q
h
− q

)(2c′

q
h
+ q

− c′

q

)))
2(q
h
− q

)2 q

2 q
h
= 0. (13)
Since p
h
> c
h
, and q
h
> q

=⇒ chq
h
>
c

q

(since c(·) is convex), the optimal quality q

is given by
the solution to
c

q
h
(q
h
− 2q

) + q

(p
h
q
h
− (q
h
− q

)(2c′

q
h
+ q

− c′

q

)) = 0. (14)
The solution to this equation yields the reaction function of firm , denoted r

(q
h
).
The corresponding first-order condition for firm h is
∂π
h
∂q
h
= 0, or
(q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

)(q
h
− q

+ c
h
− c

− 2(q
h
− q

)c′
h
)
4(q
h
− q

)2 q

2
= 0. (15)
Since q
h
> q

, it cannot be that (q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

) = 0. Hence, the optimal quality of firm h, q
h
is
given by the solution to
q
h
− q

+ c
h
− c

− 2(q
h
− q

)c′
h
= 0. (16)
Let r
h
(q

), the solution to this equation, denote the reaction function for firm h.
Now, let ψ denote the left-hand side of equation (13), and ψh the left-hand side of equation
(15). We have
∂ψ
∂q
h
=
(c′

− 1)(c
h
+ c

− c′
h
q
h
)
4q
h
2
+
(c
h
− c

)(c′
h
+ c′

)
4(q
h
− q

)
− (ch − c)
2
4(q
h
− q

)3
− (c
′
h
c′

)
(q
h
− q

)
+
(q

− c′

q

)
4q
h
2
.
Now, the first and the fifth terms sum to
(c′

−1)(c
h
+c

−c′
h
q
h
−q

)
q
h
2 > 0, since c′ < 1 (as argued in Step
2 above) c′
h
>
c
h
q
h
(by convexity of c(·), and c

< q

(else firm  has zero sales). Adding the second,
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third and fourth terms, and simplifying, we have
((c
h
− c

)− c′

(q
h
− q

))(−(c
h
− c

) + c′
h
(q
h
− q

))
4(q
h
− q

)3
.
Now, convexity of c(·) implies that c
h
> c

+ c′

(q
h
− q

), and c

> c
h
− c′
h
(q
h
− q

). Hence, this
expression is also positive. Therefore, ∂ψ∂q
h
> 0. Now, suppose firm  has chosen an optimal quality,
and firm h now increases q
h
. Then, at the original optimal quality of firm , ψ > 0. Hence, to
reach ψ = 0, firm  must increase its quality. Hence, its reaction function, r , is upward-sloping.
Next, consider ψh(qh , q). We have
∂ψh
∂q

=
(c
h
− c

− c′

(q
h
− q

))(c′
h
(q
h
− q

) + c

− c
h
)
2(q
h
− q

)3
.
Convexity of c(·) directly implies c
h
> c

+ c′

(q
h
− q

) and c′
h
>
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

. Hence, ∂ψh∂q

> 0. Now,
suppose firm h has chosen an optimal quality, and firm  now increases q

. Then, at the original
optimal quality of firm h, ψh(qh , q) > 0. Hence, to reach ψh = 0, firm h must increase its quality.
Hence, its reaction function, r
h
, is upward-sloping.
(ii) (a) Suppose both firms choose the same quality levels as in the no-PP case; that is, q
h
= qn
h
and q

= qn

. Given pn
h
from equation (7) and p
h
= 12 (qh − q + ch + c) from Proposition 1, we
have p
h
< pn
h
if and only if 12(qh − q + ch + c) <
2q
h
c
h
+q
h
c

−2q
h
q

+2q
h
2
(4q
h
−q

) . Cross-multiplying and
simplifying, this condition holds if and only if (q
h
c

− q

c
h
) + (c

− q

)(q
h
− q

) < 0. Now, q
h
> q

,
and c

≤ q

(or else firm  sells zero units). Further, since c(·) is convex, chq
h
>
c

q

, so q
h
c

−q

c
h
< 0.
Hence, p
h
< pn
h
.
(ii) (b) Consider ψ, the left-hand side of equation (13). Then,
∂ψ
∂p
h
=
1−c′

2q
h
+
c
h
−c

−c′

(q
h
−q

)
2(q
h
−q

)2
. The
argument in Step 2 of Lemma 1 is easily extended to show c′

< 1 in equilibrium. Hence, the first
term above is positive. Since c(·) is convex, c
h
> c

+c′

(q
h
−q

), so the second term is also positive.
Thus ∂ψ
∂p
h
> 0.
Now, suppose the firms choose their no-PP quality levels, qn
h
, qn

. If firm h keeps its quality level
at qn
h
and reduces its price from pn
h
to p
h
, we will have ψ > 0. Hence, firm  must reduce its quality
to ensure that ψ = 0.
6.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Moorthy (1991) provides the equilibrium for the no-PP case with quadratic costs; the qualities here
are qn
h
= 0.4098A and q
n

= 0.199A .
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Consider the case in which only firm  has PP. In Lemma 2, we demonstrate the reaction
functions for a general cost function. Substituting c(q) = Aq2, the profit-maximization condition
for the high quality firm, equation (15), reduces to (q
h
−q

)(1+Aq

−3Aq
h
) = 0, so q
h
= q3 +
1
3A (since
q
h
= q

is obviously not profit-maximizing). The corresponding condition for firm , equation (13),
is (1+A(q
h
−q

))(q
h
−2q

+A(q
h
−4q

)(q
h
−q

)) = 0. Again, the reaction function is given by setting
the second term to zero (since the first is always positive when q
h
> q

). Simultaneously solving
the two reaction functions, we obtain q
h
= 0.388A and q


= 0.164A , both lower than the corresponding
qualities in the no-PP case. It is immediate to check that the constraints 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1 are
satisfied.
Finally, we show that neither firm wants to leapfrog; that is, firm h does not want to choose a
quality lower than that of firm , and vice versa.
For convenience, call the firms 1 and 2 at this stage. Suppose firm 1 chooses q1 = 0.388A , and firm
2 chooses q2 = 0.164A in equilibrium. Note that firm 2 has PP, and firm 1 does not. In equilibrium,
firm 1 is the high quality firm. However, we wish to rule out the following deviations:
(i) firm 1 chooses some q1 < 0.164A , and becomes a lower quality firm.
(ii) firm 2 chooses some q2 > 0.388A , and becomes a higher quality firm.
Consider (i) first. Suppose firm 2 chooses q2 = 0.164A , and firm 1 does leapfrog, and chooses
q1 <
0.164
A . In particular, let the optimal quality of firm 1, given that it has lower quality than firm
2, be denoted q1 = 0.164−A , where  ≥ 0.
Note that firm 1 does not have PP, and firm 2 does. In the conjectured deviation, firm 1 has
lower quality. Hence, its profit function is given by equation (3) of the text (that is, its profit is
the same as that of the low quality firm, when only the high quality firm has PP). Replacing the
cost functions, c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2, we get
π1(qh , q) =
A2(q
h
− q

)q
h
q

2
.
Note that, in the conjectured deviation, we have q
h
= q2 = 0.164A , and q = q1 =
0.164−
A . Substituting
these into the profit function, we have
π1() =
(0.0138− 0.082)
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.082. Then, the profit of firm 1 is 0.0005A . The
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equilibrium profit of firm 1 is easily computed to be 0.011A (this is reported in Table 1 on page 14 of
the paper). Hence, there is no incentive for the high quality firm to deviate and become the lower
quality firm.
Now, consider case (ii). Suppose firm 1 chooses quality q1 = 0.388A . Suppose that firm 2 deviates
to some quality higher than this, and becomes the higher quality firm. Let the new (after deviation)
quality level for the firm 2 be q2 = 0.388+A . Since firm 2 has PP, and is now (after the deviation) the
higher quality firm, its profit function for firm 2 is given by equation (4) in the text of the paper.
Replacing the optimal price ph

of the other firm, and cost functions, c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2 and
then simplifying, we get
π2(qh , q) =
(Aq
h
2(q

− 2q
h
) + q
h
(2q
h
− 2q

+ Aq

2))2
8q
h
2(q
h
− q

)
=
(q
h
− q

)(2−A(2q
h
+ q

)2
8
.
Substituting in the qualities q
h
= q2 = 0.388+A and q = q1 =
0.388
A , we have
π2() =
0.125(0.836− 2)2
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.139. Then, the profit of firm 2 is 0.005A . This is less
than its profits at the Nash equilibrium, given by 0.018A (see Table 1). Hence, there is no incentive
for the low quality firm to deviate and become the higher quality firm.
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6.3 PP Firm Offers High Quality
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose firm  chooses a price ph

. Then, consumers with θ ≥ p
h

q

receive a non-negative utility
from product . For θ in this range, a consumer with type θ receives utility θq

−p
h
. Given the price
of firm , the best response of firm h for each θ is the maximum price ph
h
at which the consumer
obtains a weakly higher utility from product h than from (i) buying product  and (ii) not buying
the product at all. The first requirement yields θq
h
− ph
h
(θ) ≥ θq

− ph

, or ph
h
(θ) ≤ ph

+ θ(q
h
− q

).
The second one yields θq
h
− ph
h
(θ) ≥ 0, or ph
h
(θ) ≤ θq
h
. Further, we require that ph
h
(θ) ≥ c
h
for
all θ (so that firm h never exposes itself to a loss). Putting all these together, and recalling that
θ =
ph

q

, for any ph

, the best response of firm h is: for each θ ∈ [0, 1],
ph
h
(θ) =
{
max{ph

+ θ(q
h
− q

), c
h
} if θ ≥ θ
max{θq
h
, c
h
} otherwise. (17)
Now, suppose firm  charges a price ph

. Given the best response of firm h, what part of the
market can it cover? First, note that if ph

> q

, firm  makes no sales; the consumer with the
highest valuation for the good (with θ = 1) is unwilling to purchase good . Hence, we restrict
attention to prices for firm  that satisfy ph

< q

. This immediately implies that θ < 1.
Clearly, firm  has no sales in the region [0, θ), where θ =
ph

q
h
. Suppose θ ≥ chq
h
. This
implies that ph

≥ chq
h
q

. If a consumer with θ ∈ [θ, 1] buys product , her consumer surplus is
θq

− ph

≤ q

(θ − chq
h
). Firm h’s best response is to choose ph
h
(θ) to match this surplus. Then, firm
h will win over all consumers in the range [θ, 1], leaving firm  with no sales.
Hence, in the equilibrium of the pricing subgame, it must be that θ <
c
h
q
h
. From equation (17),
this implies that, for consumers in the range [0, θ], the best response of firm h is ch . Consumers
in the range [θ, 1] are charged phh(θ) = max{ph + θ(qh − q) ch}. For now, suppose phh(θ) =
ph

+ θ(q
h
− q

). We show later that, given the optimal price of firm , such a pricing policy satisfies
ph
h
(θ) ≥ c
h
for all θ ≥ θ.
Then, θ
h
= min{ ch−p

h
q
h
−q

, 1}. There are therefore two cases to consider.
Case 1 : Suppose
c
h
−p
h
q
h
−q

≤ 1, so that θ
h
=
c
h
−p
h
q
h
−q

. Then, the profit of firm from the first-order con-
dition  can be written as π

= (ph

−c

)(θ
h
−θ

). The first-order condition for profit-maximization,
∂π

∂p

= 0, directly yields firm ’s optimal price function, ph

= 12 (c +
c
h
q
h
q

). Since q

< q
h
and
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c

< c
h
, it follows that ph

< c
h
, so that the price of firm  is lower than the marginal cost of firm h.
Note also that from the convexity of c(·), it follows that chq
h
>
c

q

and it follows immediately that
ph

> c

.
Now, the optimal price of firm h for consumers in the range [θ, 1] is phh(θ) = max{ph + θ(qh −
q

) , c
h
}. Given ph

, we have θ
h
= min{ ch−p
h

q
h
−q

, 1} = min{12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chq
h
), 1}. Clearly, θ
h
> 0. If, in
addition 12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chq
h
) ≤ 1, we have θ
h
≤ 1. In this case, the best response of firm h is to price
at ph
h
(θ) = c
h
for θ ∈ [0, θ
h
] and at ph
h
(θ) = ph

+ θ(q
h
− q

) for θ ∈ (θ
h
, 1].
Case 2 : Suppose
c
h
−ph

q
h
−q

> 1, so that θ
h
= 1. From Case 1 above, this can happen in the equilibrium
of the pricing subgame only if 12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chq
h
) > 1.
Then, the profit function of firm  can be written as πh = (p− c)(1− θ), where p is the price
charged by firm . Since θ

=
ph

q

< 1, it is immediate that 0 < θ

< θ
h
≤ 1.
The first-order condition suggests that the optimal price of firm  is ph

= c+q2 . To ensure that
firm  captures all consumers in the segment [θ

, 1], it must further be that the consumer with θ = 1
obtains at least as high a surplus from firm  as from firm h. From firm h, this consumer obtains
a surplus q
h
− c
h
(since he is offered good h at price c
h
). From firm , he obtains q

− ph

. Adding
this extra restriction, the optimal price of firm  in this case is ph

= min{c
h
− (q
h
− q

), c+q2 }. The
optimal price of firm h is ph
h
(θ) = c
h
for all consumers in the range [0, θ
h
].
Lemma 3 In the equilibrium of the whole game, 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1.
Proof of Lemma 3: Given Proposition 3, all we need to show is that θ
h
< 1. The argument is
similar to that in Lemma 1. Again, we show that c′

< 1 in equilibrium. This implies that there
exists a q
h
such that firm h earns a positive profit. Hence, firm h will not choose a q
h
such that
θ
h
= 1.
Suppose that c′

≥ 1. From the proof of Proposition 3, θh = 1 implies that 12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chqh) ≥ 1,
or ch−cqh−q ≥ 2−
ch
qh
. First, suppose ch−cqh−q = 2−
ch
qh
. Then, θh− θ = 1− 12( chqh +
c
q
). The derivative of
this term with respect to q

is − c
′

q

−c

q

2 < 0 (since c′ >
c

q

). Hence, if q

falls slightly, the market
coverage of firm  increases.
Further, ph

− c

= 12(
c
h
q

q
h
− c

). The derivative of this w.r.t. q

is chq
h
− c′

. Now, the consumer
with type θ
h
is indifferent between good  and good h. Hence, he obtains a positive surplus from
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good h. Since θ
h
= 1 by assumption, this implies c
h
≤ ph
h
< q
h
. Hence, chq
h
< c′

when c′

≥ 1.
Hence, this term also increases if q

falls slightly.
Now, π = (θh − θ)(ph − c). Since both terms increase when q falls, π increases when q falls.
Since the argument holds at any quality such that c′

≥ 1, it must be that c′

< 1 in equilibrium.
Next, suppose that θ
h
= 1, and 12(
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

+ chq
h
) > 1. It is immediate that a small reduction in
q

increases the market coverage of firm . In this case, its optimal price is ph

= min{c
h
− (q
h
−
q

), c+q2 }. Whichever of these two is lower, the derivative of ph − c , the profit per unit, is less
than or equal zero whenever c′

≥ 1. Hence, reducing q

weakly improves the profit per unit. Hence,
at equilibrium, it must be that c′

< 1.
Given that c′

< 1, as before, this implies that there exists a q
h
at which firm h earns a positive
profit; that is, θ
h
< 1.
6.3.1 Derivation of Reaction Functions
We show (as an aside; this is used in Proof of Proposition 5) that the reaction functions are upward
sloping.
Lemma 4 (i) The reaction functions of both firms are upward-sloping in the range of quality such
that c′(q

) < 1.
(ii) Suppose both firms offer the no-PP qualities, qn
h
, qn

, and firm h now adopts PP. Then, compared
to the no-PP case: (a) if firms remain at their original qualities, qn
h
, qn

, the optimal defensive
strategy of firm  is to charge a lower price (b) Compared to the no-PP case, if firm  remains at
its original quality, qn

, then the optimal strategy of firm h is to increase its quality.
Proof of Lemma 4
(i) We first derive the reaction functions of the two firms. As shown in equations (3) and (4) of the
text, the profit functions of the firms in this case are
πh

(q
h
, q

) = (θ
h
− θ

)(ph

− c

) =
(c
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2q
h
q

(q
h
− q

)
(18)
πh
h
(q
h
, q

) =
∫ 1
θ
h
(ph
h
(θ)− c
h
)dθ =
(ph

+ q
h
− q

− c
h
)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(19)
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We focus on an interior equilibrium with 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1. We restrict attention to qualities such
that c′(q

) < 1 because we have shown that the equilibrium qualities satisfy this restriction. The
reaction functions are valid for all qualities in this range; as shown in the proof of Lemma 3, if
c′(q

) < 1, there exist qualities q
h
at which firm h can earn a positive profit (and therefore θ
h
< 1).
The first-order condition for firm h is
∂πh
h
∂q
h
= 0,
(ph

+ q
h
− q

− c
h
)
q
h
− q

{
1− c′
h
+
q

(c′
h
q
h
− c
h
)
2(q
h
)2
− p
h

+ q
h
− q

− c
h
2(q
h
− q

)
}
= 0. (20)
Firm h’s reaction function, rh
h
(q

) is the solution to this equation.
The corresponding first-order condition for firm  is
∂πh

∂q

= 0, which gives us
(c
h
q

− c

q
h
)(c

(q
h
− 2q

) + q

(c
h
− 2c′

(q
h
− q

))
(2q

(q
h
− q

))2
= 0. (21)
Since chq
h
>
c

q

, it cannot be that (c
h
q

− c

q
h
) = 0. Hence, the optimal quality of firm , q

is given
by the solution to
c

(q
h
− 2q

) + q

(c
h
− 2c′

(q
h
− q

)) = 0. (22)
Firm ’s reaction function, r
h
(q
h
) is the solution to this equation.
Now, let ψ be the left-hand side of equation (21), the first-order condition for firm , and ψh the
left-hand side of equation (20), the first order condition of firm h. Then, ∂ψ∂q
h
=
(c
h
−c

−c′

(q
h
−q

))(c

−c
h
+c′
h
(q
h
−q

))
2(q
h
−q

)3
.
Convexity of c(·) directly implies c
h
> c

+ c′

(q
h
− q

) and c′
h
>
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

. Hence, ∂ψ∂q
h
> 0, so that to
reach ψ = 0, firm  must increase its quality.
Next, consider ψh(qh , q). Recalling that p
h

is a function of q
h
, q

, we have
∂ψh
∂q

=
1
4
(
(c
h
− q
h
c′
h
)(c
h
− (2− c′

)q
h
)
q
h
2
+
(c′
h
+ c′

)(c
h
− c

)
(q
h
− q

)2
− (ch − c)
2
(q
h
− q

)3
− (c
′
h
c′

)
(q
h
− q

)
)
.
Consider the first term. Since c(·) is strictly convex, c
h
< q
h
c′
h
. Further, by assumption, c′

< 1.
Hence, the first term is strictly positive. Adding terms 2, 3 and 4 we have
∂ψh
∂q

=
(c
h
− c

− c′

(q
h
− q

))(c

− c
h
+ c′
h
(q
h
− q

))
4(q
h
− q

)3
.
Convexity of c(·) directly implies c
h
> c

+ c′

(q
h
− q

) and c′
h
>
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

. Hence, ∂ψh∂q

> 0, and to
reach ψh = 0, firm h must increase its quality.
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(ii) (a) Given pn

from equation (8) and ph

from Proposition 3, we have ph

< pn

if and only
if chq+cqh2q
h
<
2q
h
c

+q

c
h
+q
h
q

−q

2
(4q
h
−q

) . Cross-multiplying and simplifying, this condition reduces to
q

(q
h
− q

)(c
h
− q
h
+ q
h
( ch−cq
h
−q

− 1)) < 0. Now, q
h
> q

, and c
h
≤ q
h
(else firm h sells zero units).
Further, in equilibrium ch−cq
h
−q

+ chq
h
< 2 (since θ
h
< 1, from Lemma 3). Multiplying throughout by
q
h
and rearranging, this implies that c
h
− q
h
+ q
h
( ch−cq
h
−q

− 1) < 0. Hence ph

< pn

.
(ii) (b) The profit function of the high quality firm is given by the equation πh
h
(q
h
, q

) =
(ph

+q
h
−q

−c
h
)2
2(q
h
−q

) .
Consider rh
h
(q

) the reaction function for firm h. Taking the partial of this expression with respect to
ph

and replacing the optimal price, gives the following ∂
∂ph

(
dπh
h
dq
h
) = 12(
c
h
−q
h
c′
h
q
h
+
(c
h
−c

−(q
h
−q

)c′
h
)
(q
h
−q

)2
).
The first term is clearly negative. From the convexity of the cost function, the second term is
strictly less than 0, from which the inequality holds.
6.3.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose only firm h has PP. Substituting c(q) = Aq2, the profit-maximization condition of firm 
reduces to (q
h
− 2q

)(q
h
− q

) = 0, which yields the reaction function q

= qh2 (since q = qh is not
profit-maximizing). Similarly, the profit-maximization condition of firm h reduces to (2−A(2q
h
+
q

)) (2 + 3A(q

− 2q
h
)) = 0. Since the reaction function of firm h is upward-sloping (from Lemma
2), it must be given by the second term in the above equation. This yields q
h
= 2+3Aq6A . Now,
simultaneously solving the two reaction functions gives the equilibrium qualities: qh
h
= 49A =
0.444
A ,
and qh

= 29A =
0.222
A . Both qualities are higher than the respective qualities in the no-PP case.
Again, it is immediate to verify that the constraints 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1 are satisfied.
Finally, we show that neither firm wants to leapfrog; that is, firm h does not want to choose a
quality lower than that of firm , and vice versa.
For convenience, call the firms 1 and 2 at this stage. Suppose firm 1 chooses q1 = 0.444A , and firm
2 chooses q2 = 0.222A in equilibrium. Note that firm 1 has PP, and firm 2 does not. In equilibrium,
firm 1 is the high quality firm. However, we wish to rule out the following leapfrogs:
(i) firm 1 chooses some q1 < 0.222A , and becomes a lower quality firm.
(ii) firm 2 chooses some q2 > 0.444A , and becomes a higher quality firm.
Consider (i) first. Suppose firm 2 chooses q2 = 0.222A , and firm 1 does leapfrog, and chooses
q1 <
0.222
A . In particular, let the optimal quality of firm 1, given that it has lower quality than firm
2, be denoted q1 = 0.222−A , where  ≥ 0. Since firm 1 has lower quality, but has PP, its profit function
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is given by equation (1) of the paper (reproduced as equation (11) of the appendix). Replacing the
optimal price p
h
for the firm without PP, and cost functions, c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2, we get
π1(qh , q) =
(q
h
q

+ Aq
h
2q

− q

2 − 2Aq
h
q

2 + Aq

3)2
8q
h
q

(q
h
− q

)
=
(1 + A(q
h
− q

))2(q
h
− q

)q

8q
h
.
Substituting in the qualities q
h
= q2 = 0.222A and q = q1 =
0.222−
A , we have
π1() =
0.56(0.222− )(1 + )2
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.121. Then, the profit of firm 1 is 0.008A . This is
less than its profits at the Nash equilibrium, given by 0.022A (see Table 1 on page 14 of the paper).
Hence, there is no incentive for the high quality firm to deviate and become the lower quality firm.
Next, consider case (ii). Suppose firm 1 chooses quality q1 = 0.444A . Suppose that firm 2 deviates
to some quality higher than this, and becomes the higher quality firm. Let the new (after deviation)
quality level for the firm 2 be q2 = 0.444+A . Given that it has higher quality, the profit function for
firm 2 is given by equation (2) of the text, or (12) of the appendix. Replacing the cost functions,
c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2 and then simplifying, we get
π2(qh , q) =
(1−A(q
h
+ q

))2(q
h
− q

)
2
.
Substituting in the qualities q
h
= q2 = 0.444+A and q = q1 =
0.444
A , we have
π2() =
0.5(0.112− )2
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.037. Then, the profit of firm 2 is 0.0001A . This is less
than its profits at the Nash equilibrium, given by 0.006A (see Table 1). Hence, there is no incentive
for the low quality firm to deviate and become the higher quality firm.
36
6.4 Both Firms have PP
Proof of Proposition 5
As in the low-PP and high-PP cases, in the equilibrium of the whole game, 0 < θ

< θ
h
< 1
(the argument is similar to Lemma 1, with the one difference that θ
h
= ch−cq
h
−q

; for brevity, we do
not repeat it here). Hence, we ignore the constraints 0 ≤ θ

≤ θ
h
≤ 1, and focus on the interior
solution.
The profit functions of the firms in this case are:
πb
h
(q
h
, q

) =
∫ 1
θ
h
(c

+ θ(q
h
− q

)− c
h
)dθ =
(q
h
− q

− c
h
+ c

)2
2(q
h
− q

)
(23)
πb

(q
h
, q

) =
∫ θˆ
θ

(θq

− c

)dθ +
∫ θ
h
θˆ
(c
h
− θ(q
h
− q

)− c

)dθ =
(c
h
q

− q
h
c

)2
2q
h
q

(q
h
− q

)
. (24)
As argued in the text, the profit function of firm h is the same as in the low-PP case. Hence its
reaction function is also the same as in the low-PP case, and is given by the solution to equation
(16). Similarly, the profit function of firm  is the same as in the high-PP case, so its reaction
function is given by the solution to equation (22).
(i) From equation (16), we know that the optimal quality of firm h is the solution to the equation
ψh(qh , q) = 1− 2c′h +
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

= 0. We evaluate ψh at the equilibrium qualities when only firm h has
PP, q
h
, q

. These are the solutions to the two equations (20) and (22).
From equation (20),
1− 2c′
h
+
c
h
− c

q
h
− q

= −q(c
′
h
− (c
h
/q
h
))
q
h
− 2 + ch − p
h

q
h
− q

+
c
h
− c

q
h
− q

.
Now, c′
h
>
c
h
q
h
since c(·) is convex. Further, q
h
− c
h
> q

− c

, else firm h has zero sales. Since
ph

> c

, this yields
c
h
−ph

q
h
−q

<
c
h
−c

q
h
−q

< 1. Therefore, at the qualities (q
h
, q

), ψh < 0. Hence, to reach
a quality at which ψh(qh , q) = 0, firm h must decrease its quality. Since both reaction functions
are upward sloping, firm  will also decrease its quality.
(ii) The reaction function of firm h is the same as in the low-PP case. From Proposition 2, this
is q
h
= q3 +
1
3A . Similarly, the reaction function of firm  is the same as in the high-PP case.
From Proposition 4, q

= qh2 . Solving these simultaneously, we have q
b
h
= 0.4A and q
b

= 0.2A . The
corresponding qualities in the low-PP case are 0.388A and
0.164
A . Clearly, both qualities are higher
when both firms have PP.
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Finally, we show that neither firm wants to leapfrog; that is, firm h does not want to choose a
quality lower than that of firm , and vice versa.
First, consider firm h. For convenience, call the firms 1 and 2 at this stage. Suppose firm 2
chooses q2 = 0.2A , which is the lower quality in equilibrium. In equilibrium, firm 1 chooses q1 =
0.4
A .
However, we wish to rule out a leapfrog, whereby firm 1 chooses some q1 < 0.2A , and becomes a
lower quality firm.
To show this, suppose firm 2 chooses q2 = 0.2A , and firm 1 does leapfrog, and chooses q1 <
0.2
A . In
particular, let the optimal quality of firm 1, given that it has lower quality than firm 2, be denoted
q1 = 0.2−A , where  ≥ 0. Since firm 1 has lower quality, its profit function is given by equation (24).
Replacing the cost functions, c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2 and then simplifying, we get
π1(qh , q) =
A2(q
h
− q

)q
h
q

2
.
Substituting in the qualities q
h
= q2 = 0.2A and q = q1 =
0.2−
A , we have
π1() =
(0.02− 0.1)
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.1. Then, the profit of firm 1 is 0.001A . This is less
than its profits at the Nash equilibrium, given by 0.016A (see Table 1 on page 14 of the paper). Hence,
there is no incentive for the high quality firm to deviate and become the lower quality firm.
Next, we show that the low quality firm has no incentive to deviate and become the higher
quality firm. Suppose firm 1 chooses quality q1 = 0.4A . Suppose that firm 2 deviates to some quality
higher than this, and becomes the higher quality firm. Let the new (after deviation) quality level
for the firm 2 be q2 = 0.4+A . Given that it has higher quality, the profit function for firm 2 is given
by equation (23). Replacing the cost functions, c
h
= Aq
h
2 and c

= Aq

2 and then simplifying, we
get
π2(qh , q) =
(1−A(q
h
+ q

))2(q
h
− q

)
2
.
Substituting in the qualities q
h
= q2 = 0.4+A and q = q1 =
0.4
A , we have
π2() =
0.5(0.2− )2
A
.
Maximizing this with respect to  yields ∗ = 0.066. Then, the profit of firm 2 is 0.0005A . This is less
than its profits at the Nash equilibrium, given by 0.008A (see Table 1). Hence, there is no incentive
for the low quality firm to deviate and become the higher quality firm.
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